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Natural disasters have received considerable media attention in recent years due to the 
incidence of a number of high-profile occurrences such as the 2004 South Asian Tsunami, 
Hurricane Katrina and the Kashmiri earthquake in 2005 and the California wildfires of 2007. 
According to the WHO-sponsored CRED International Disaster Database (EM-DAT, 2007), 
3,472 natural disasters have occurred worldwide since 2000, including droughts, famines, 
earthquakes, flooding, windstorms and extreme temperatures. Collectively these incidents were 
responsible for over half a million deaths and affected an additional 1.8 billion individuals. In 
addition to the human costs, reinsurer Munich Re also shows that the financial costs of natural 
disasters to society are rising at a staggering rate, topping 280 billion US dollars in 2004/05 
alone (Munich Re, 2005).  
These costs are traditionally mitigated to some extent by the financial and material 
response by governments, intergovernmental- and non-governmental organizations. Yet 
recognition is on the rise that companies are key players in disaster relief efforts, pooling cash 
and in-kind resources and managing complex logistic operations on a large scale (Fritz Institute, 
2005; IBLF, 2006). A recent paper by Muller and Whiteman (2008) shows that Fortune Global 
500 firms collectively donated cash and resources valued at over $1.2 billion dollars (US) in 
response to the Tsunami, Hurricane Katrina and the Kashmiri earthquake combined. In addition 
to donating cash, firms also leveraged their core competences, for instance by using their 
distribution networks to deliver disaster relief supplies or donating heavy equipment to help clear 
wreckage.  
We term this behavior “corporate philanthropic disaster response”, or CPDR, after Muller 
and Whiteman (2008), and recognize that such behavior may be important to society because of 
the potential firms have to benefit those in need. Considerable attention has been paid in recent   3 
years to the potential firms have to invest resources in addressing social ills, with arguments 
linked to the scale of resources firms possess, competences they may have or specific goods or 
services they can deliver (Hess, Rogovsky, and Dunfee, 2002; Margolis and Walsh, 2003). Thus 
far, however, organizational research has not explored in what ways CPDR might be beneficial 
to the firm itself. The conventional wisdom with regard to corporate philanthropy has 
traditionally been that shareholders would view such donations as a “non-productive cost” 
(Murray and Montanari, 1986) or a misappropriation of company (shareholder) resources 
without any clear relevance for firm performance (Friedman, 1970; Bartkus, Morris, and Seifert, 
2002). Yet a burgeoning body of literature argues that specific, clearly identifiable social 
behaviors such as philanthropic donations can be considered strategic “investments” that benefit 
both the firm and society (Godfrey, 2004).  
Several authors argue that if philanthropy becomes more “strategic”, it will reduce the 
cost to the firm while leading to more tangible returns (Hess, Rogovsky, and Dunfee, 2002; 
Porter and Kramer, 2002; Saiia, Carroll, and Buchholtz, 2003). Similarly, others suggest that 
philanthropy can be a source of competitive advantage resulting from positive reputation effects 
among consumers (Brammer and Millington, 2005; Fombrun and Shanley, 1990) and other types 
of stakeholders, leading to reduced transaction costs and risk mitigation (Hillman and Keim, 
2001; Jones, 1995), or improved access to vital resources as a result of enhanced legitimacy 
(Arthur, 2003). There is also some evidence to suggest that investors recognize the potential 
value of such investments (Derwall, Guenster, Bauer, and Koedijk, 2005; Graves and Waddock, 
1994; Johnson and Greening, 1999; Kreander, Gray, Power, and Sinclair, 2005; Sen, 
Bhattacharya and Korschun, 2006; Statman, 2000). In some cases investors have even used their 
voting power to successfully steer companies towards social behavior (Carleton, Nelson and   4 
Weisbach, 1998). While the relationship between philanthropy and financial performance 
remains inconclusive (Galaskiewicz, 1997; Griffon and Mahon, 1997), it has also been noted that 
stockholder pressure to provide strategic justification for giving has increased (Bartkus et al., 
2002).  
Muller and Whiteman (2008) report that firms typically communicate their CPDR to the 
public through press releases or website communiqués. For the purposes of this paper, each 
individual communication can be seen as a discrete event representing a social investment by the 
firm. Relationships between discrete events and investor responses are commonly investigated in 
the financial literature using event studies, a technique aimed at isolating abnormal returns 
following a given event such as CEO succession, plant closures or corporate refocusing 
(McWilliams and Siegel, 1997). Event studies related to firms’ social behavior are relatively rare 
and largely inconclusive. Meznar, Nigh, and Kwok (1998), for example, found that divestment 
from South Africa under apartheid had mixed effects on stock prices depending on the event 
window, while McWilliams and Siegel (1997) found no relationship at all. Arthur (2003) found 
that company announcements on the implementation of work-family initiatives, which she linked 
to enhanced organizational legitimacy, triggered positive market responses. Studies on 
environmental performance (Klassen and McLaughlin, 1996; Rao, 1996; Shane and Spicer, 
1983) have also generally found a positive relationship, linked principally to explicit financial 
risks such as fines and cleanup costs.  
Thus far, however, no known research has investigated investor reactions to individual 
philanthropic acts in general, let alone to CPDR announcements. The scale of media attention for 
corporate behavior in the wake of this and other recent disasters such as the Tsunami, Hurricane 
Rita and the earthquake in Kashmir also suggests that societal actors may expect firms to donate   5 
in response to future disasters. Climate research also suggests that the incidence of in particular 
severe tropical storms may be on the increase (Emanuel, 2005; Trenberth, 2005), and therefore 
that events like Katrina may occur more frequently in the future. If the corporate role in 
responding to Katrina was so prominent, it is an important case for exploring whether, and under 
what conditions, donating in response to disasters can be beneficial to the firm itself. This 
contribution can generate valuable information not only for managers, but also in terms of our 
understanding as organizational researchers of the (changing) role of firms in society. 
In this paper, we address this gap in the literature by considering stock market reactions 
to announcements made by US Fortune Global 500 firms concerning their corporate donations to 
disaster relief efforts in the days and weeks following Hurricane Katrina in August of 2005. The 
remainder of the paper is as follows. We begin by exploring theoretical arguments that suggest a 
possible link between philanthropic donations to disaster relief and stock market reactions. We 
subsequently build on these arguments by developing a number of testable hypotheses aimed at 
donation characteristics expected to influence the degree and direction of stock market reactions 
to donation announcements. Then we describe our event study methodology and data and present 
our findings. Finally, we draw conclusions and managerial implications, and highlight our key 
contributions to the literature. 
 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina hit the Gulf coast and became one of the costliest 
and most deadly hurricanes to hit the United States. When weakened infrastructure caused the 
levees surrounding New Orleans to break, most of the city was flooded and many people were 
trapped in their homes, despite an earlier mandatory evacuation order by the New Orleans   6 
mayor. The confirmed death toll is listed at 1,836 plus another 700 still missing (Hunter, 2006), 
with total damage estimated at $81.2 billion (US Department of Commerce, 2006). The 
corporate response was magnanimous: one source estimated that as much as one third of all 
donations collected for Katrina disaster relief and reconstruction efforts originated from the 
private sector (Heher, 2005). Unclear is how investors perceived and interpreted these actions – 
or whether investors noticed them at all. 
 
CPDR as a factor in market value  
A diverse body of literature has emerged that focuses on the potential value to the firm of 
socially responsive behavior. Many argue that corporate philanthropy, typically considered a 
type of socially responsive behavior, is becoming increasingly “strategic” (Hess et al, 2002). 
Strategic philanthropy is aimed at increased synergies between corporate philanthropic efforts 
and overall business objectives, establishing a link between philanthropy and the prospect of 
enhanced future profits (Porter and Kramer, 2002; Saiia et al., 2003). In this line of reasoning, 
firms are increasingly successful at creating positive economic spin-offs through synergies 
between their social investments and existing business strategy (Porter and van der Linde, 1995). 
Such spin-offs can have specific, tangible benefits that enhance both the company’s strategic 
position as well as benefiting the recipient (Husted, 2003; Porter and Kramer, 2002; Saiia et al., 
2003). For instance, Hess et al. (2002) describe the investments made by book and newspaper 
publishers to fight illiteracy, Sen et al. (2006) explore the investments made by Procter & 
Gamble in dental awareness in lower-income communities, and Porter and Kramer (2002) 
recount the investments Cisco has made in developing a pool of computer network   7 
administrators in the community at large. In all cases the companies involved utilize their 
resources to address a social problem in ways that also benefit the companies themselves.  
Corporate philanthropy can also generate less tangible benefits, loosely described as 
“moral capital” or “relational wealth” (Godfrey, 2004) that may still translate into higher 
performance expectations. While it has been established that corporate philanthropy is positively 
related to greater brand equity and consumer perceptions (Ricks, 2005), philanthropy may also 
be perceived as a means to enhance reputation among a broader range of stakeholders (Brammer 
and Millington, 2005; Fombrun and Shanley, 1990). Hess et al. (2002) describe in this regard the 
reputational capital that protected McDonalds from being damaged by rioters in LA in 1992 
following the acquittal of the police officers on trial for assaulting Rodney King. Company 
executives asserted that the reason not a single of the sixty McDonalds locations in the area 
experienced damage was due to the fact that their Ronald McDonald houses and their employee-
development programs had such a strong reputation in the community.  
A strong reputation can lead to higher levels of trust and legitimacy, which some authors 
note may lead to reduced transaction costs and thus improved performance or access to vital 
resources (Arthur, 2003; Jones, 1995). Porter and Kramer (2002) also point out that this trust and 
legitimacy can extend to social actors like NGOs, which play a growing role in shaping company 
reputations and exert tangible influence on company strategy, sometimes even as shareholders 
(Doh and Guay, 2006). Trust and legitimacy can in turn reduce perceptions of risk associated 
with the firm (Hillman and Keim, 2001) and this risk reduction motive has been linked explicitly 
to philanthropy (Brammer and Pavelin, 2005). Improved access to resources, reduced transaction 
costs, favorable consumer attitudes and support from NGOs can raise prospects of future   8 
performance that will affect stakeholder attitudes and decisions, not least among them analysts, 
rating agencies, creditors and investors (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990).  
With respect to the specific case of CPDR, there are indications that this behavior was at 
least to some extent strategic. The press releases issued by companies documenting their 
response to Hurricane Katrina contain countless examples of efforts by companies to leverage 
their resources, relationships and competencies in ways that would not only help disaster victims, 
but ultimately would have tangible benefits for the firms themselves. For instance, Tyson Foods, 
the world’s largest producer of meat and pork products, offered hurricane evacuees jobs in 
production, maintenance, management and management support, even offering to provide 
relocation assistance to those hired
1. Honda, in addition to donating cash, also donated the use of 
its power generators, all terrain vehicles, pumps and watercraft to disaster relief workers.
2 While 
the benefit of these efforts to those in need seems evident, it is clear that these donations are also 
synergistic with company goals in terms of reputation, brand value, maintaining operations and 
stimulating demand for its own products. CPDR, as a potentially strategic form of philanthropy, 
may therefore lead to the kind of benefits to the firm that are recognized by investors. 
In sum, the literature suggests that there may be business-strategic reasons for firms to 
engage in CPDR, and that stock markets may recognize the potential value of that donation 
behavior. Our overarching hypothesis, therefore, is as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 1: CPDR announcements will be associated with positive abnormal stock 
returns. 
                                                 
1 Tyson Foods press release, September 14, 2005 
[http://www.tyson.com/Corporate/PressRoom/ViewArticle.aspx?id=1895] 
2 Honda USA press release, September 2, 2005 
[http://world.honda.com/news/2005/c050902_hurricanekatrina.html] 
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Strategic dimensions of CPDR  
Luo and Bhattacharya (2006) argue that because different firms have different resources, 
competences, reputations and products, there is “no simple, unconditional relationship between 
CSR [corporate social responsibility] and market value”. Rather, they claim, those differences 
will result in different market returns (i.e. positive, insignificant or negative) under different 
conditions. We follow a similar line of reasoning in the case of CPDR as an expression of 
strategic philanthropy. Although in contrast to Luo and Bhattacharya (2006) we do in fact 
hypothesize an overall positive stock market response to CPDR, we also introduce a number of 
factors which we expect will shape the magnitude of that positive response.  
For instance, it has been suggested that philanthropy can be more strategic if a company 
is able to leverage synergies with other members of its business network such as business 
associates or clients (Husted, 2003; Porter and Kramer, 2002). As Porter and Kramer (2002) 
argue, companies are increasingly working in partnership with external suppliers and other 
institutions as an alternative for vertical integration. As a result, companies’ business success is 
increasingly linked to the strength of their relationships with other organizations within their 
“clusters”. In developing the strength of the cluster, the local business environment and the 
relevant market, member organizations pool resources for a common goal. Similarly, initial 
research on corporate responses to the South Asian Tsunami in 2004 shows that companies in 
many cases included funds donated by employees, customers and/or business relations in their 
total reported donation amount (Muller, Whiteman and van der Voort, 2006).  
This ability to draw on additional sources of donations signals two important points. 
First, given that such firms are apparently able to exploit their networks to draw on resources   10 
external to the firm, they must already enjoy a positive reputation with stakeholders in those 
networks and are, in the terms of Porter and Kramer (2002), able to leverage those relationships. 
Leveraging synergies with a company’s business relations in this way should enhance 
perceptions of stock market actors that the philanthropic effort is strategic. Second, the inclusion 
of employee, customer and/or business associate donations in the total reported donation amount 
imply that the firm may be able to benefit from enhanced reputation “at a discount”, since it is 
not incurring the full cost of the announced donation value by itself. Therefore we hypothesize 
the following: 
 
Hypothesis 2: CPDR announcements that refer to the inclusion of third-party donations 
in the total reported donation amount will be associated with greater positive abnormal 
stock returns than CPDR announcements of donations based solely on company funds. 
 
The literature also considers numerous anecdotal examples of firms donating goods and 
services in line with their core business. Hess et al. (2002), for instance, describe the role 
pharmaceutical companies can and do play in donating aids medication in Africa, and link such 
activities to the potential for future market development. Ricks (2005) describes philanthropy of 
this kind as “directed” (as opposed to “general”), because the in-kind donations benefit segments 
of the population that the company is likely to target for business anyway. This could be 
considered a form of cause-related marketing because the goods involved clearly are associated 
with the company brand. Alternatively, donating in kind may allow a company to write off 
excess inventory while deducting taxes. For these reasons we expect investors to perceive CPDR 
that includes in-kind donations to be more strategic than cash-only donations. Thus:   11 
 
Hypothesis 3: CPDR announcements that refer to the inclusion of in-kind donations will 
be associated with greater positive abnormal stock returns than CPDR announcements 
referring to cash-only donations. 
 
Porter and Kramer (2002: 58) discuss the strategic value of philanthropy in terms of 
“improving the quality of the business environment in the location or locations where they 
operate”. Investing in rebuilding local infrastructure, for example, will ultimately help the 
company to operate effectively again more quickly. Donations aimed at reconstructive efforts 
may be seen by investors more as a long-term investment in reconstituting the local market and 
infrastructure. Such reconstruction sponsoring efforts may also have less tangible benefits, such 
as reputational gains associated with a longer term visibility in the region.  
These benefits may also be linked to the initial local presence companies had in the 
disaster-stricken region. Much of the literature on social behavior links such behavior to 
companies’ presence in “local communities” (Waddock and Boyle, 1995), and much of the 
literature on philanthropy considers philanthropy as the outcome of geographically relatively 
localized relationships between firms and charities (Galaskiewicz, 1997; Marquis, Davis and 
Glynn, 2007; Saiia et al., 2003). Existing research on company responses to disasters has 
emphasized the role companies can play in securing the livelihoods of their employees and 
reducing stress levels associated with disasters (Sanchez, Korbin, and Viscarra, 1995). This 
enhances reputation among employees and the community at large. Wal-Mart, for example, was 
touted in the media for taking measures to maintain employment for its dislocated workers 
(Barbaro and Gillis, 2005). Finally, donating to an area in which the company is active also aids   12 
the company in reestablishing its position in those markets more quickly. Wal-Mart was also 
noted for quickly setting up “mini Wal-Marts” in disaster-ravaged areas to supply customers 
with basic necessities (ibid.). Therefore we expect that the local links the company has in the 
disaster-stricken area will not only raise the legitimacy of the response, but also leads to greater 
expectations of tangible benefits to the firm through reputation enhancement, employee 
satisfaction and market share. This leads to the following two hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 4: CPDR announcements that emphasize contributions to long term 
reconstruction will be associated with greater positive abnormal stock returns than 
CPDR announcements that emphasize short term disaster relief. 
 
Hypothesis 5: CPDR announcements that emphasize the donating firm’s local presence 
in the disaster-stricken region will be associated with greater positive abnormal stock 
returns than CPDR announcements that do not emphasize such a local presence. 
 
 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
Sample 
We explore these hypotheses using event study methodology to generate our dependent 
variable,  abnormal  returns  associated  with  the  donation  “event”,  for  all  market-listed  US 
companies  on  the  2004  Fortune  Global  500  that  issued  a  press  release  documenting  their 
donation efforts subsequent to Hurricane Katrina on a specific, identifiable date. The time-event 
method  allows  separating  returns  to  stockholders  into  two  components:  (1)  normal  returns   13 
representing the returns stockholders should receive to compensate them for the market risk (β) 
of the stock, and (2) abnormal returns above (or below) those which shareholders would expect 
to receive based on market risk. These returns are of substantial theoretical interest because they 
do not result from overall movements of the market but rather from events specific to a firm, 
events for which a management might reasonably held responsible (Kerr and Bettis, 1987). 
The S&P 500 Composite is used as a benchmark to calculate daily volatility of stock 
returns.  Return  data  for  all  securities  and  the  S&P  500  composite  were  gathered  from  the 
database of the Centre for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). This dataset covers the period 
from September 1, 2004 until February 28, 2006. Of the 190 US companies in the Fortune 
Global  500,  134  announced  donations  in  response  to  Hurricane  Katrina.  After  excluding 
companies  that  did  not  specify  the  date  the  announcement  was  made  (undated  website 
communiqué), a sample of 108 remained that was used to analyze the effect of the press release 
on the stock price. These 108 firms issued CPDR announcements reporting aggregated donations 
of over $375 million during the period August 28 – November 23, 2005 (see Appendix for 
complete  listing  of  firms  and  announcement  dates).  The  average  donation  value  was  $3.5 
million, with the median value at exactly $2 million. 
 
Event study approach 
We use the event study approach to analyze the overall impact of CPDR announcements 
on companies’ stock prices, which we hypothesize to be positive (Hypothesis 1). An event study 
is a method to measure the effect of a news release on the stock price and is regularly used in 
financial research (McWilliams and Siegel, 1997). The event definition in this paper is the day 
on which a company issued a press release or published an announcement regarding a corporate   14 
donation in response to the Katrina disaster. For each individual firm, this is the date of the event 
t = 0. The event window will start at the closing price of the stock of a company before the 
announcement day and will cover a period until the closing price of the day of the announcement 
day t = 0, creating a one-day period event window. We use the closing price before the 
announcement day since we cannot exclude the possibility that the donation was announced 
before trading hours. 
We maintain as short an event window as possible (McWilliams and Siegel, 1997) in 
accordance with the assumption that markets process information instantaneously. The period 
prior to the event window is called the pre-announcement period and will cover the days t = [-10, 
-1] before the event. The post-announcement period covers the days t = [1, 10] after the event. 
These periods are needed to check whether there is already an effect before the announcement or 
a possible delayed reaction. The choice for a ten-day pre- and post announcement period is 
because the announcement or news release covering the donation is a sudden event. In order to 
minimize the chance that other important announcements influence the outcome of this study, the 
period has to be kept short (McWilliams and Siegel, 1997).  
Daily returns are calculated by using the lognormal formula Rt = ln (Pt/Pt-1) x 100% over 
the interval from September 29, 2004 to August 12, 2005. The dataset also contains the daily 
returns of the S&P500 Composite for the same period as the market portfolio returns. Following 
the reasoning of Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay (1997) it is important that the estimation period 
and the event window do not overlap, to prevent the “normal” returns from being influenced by 
the event itself and thus distorting the abnormal return. The above-mentioned estimation period 
does not overlap the event or the pre-announcement period and covers a period of 229 trading 
days.    15 
Abnormal returns are the differences between the ex post return of the security over the 
event window and the “normal” return of the firm over the event window. The normal returns are 
the returns that could have been expected had the event not taken place. There are several models 
to come up with normal return, but the most commonly used model is the market model because 
of its enhanced ability to increased ability to detect event effects (Brown and Warner, 1985; 
MacKinlay, 1997).  
The market model links the return of a security to the market portfolio of that security. 
This model provides a generated modeled normal return R*it which is the expected return for any 
security i: 
 
R*it = αi + βiRmt + εit      (1)     
with                 E[εit] = 0   and    Var[εit] = σit
 2           
 
where R*it is the model return t of security i and Rmt is the return of the market portfolio, and εit 
is the disturbance term that has a zero mean. To derive the abnormal return, the following 
formula (2) is applied: 
 
    (2)     
 where    is the abnormal return t of security i, Rit and Rmt are the returns on t of security i and 
the market portfolio, respectively. The parameters   and   are estimated by an Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) regression. Formula (2) expressed in simplified manner makes formula (3): 
 
  
∗ − = it it
i
t AR R R          (3)     
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Regression analysis 
We used OLS regressions to test hypotheses 2 through 5, using the abnormal return 
(ARit) on each firm’s stock on day 0 as derived from the event study above as our dependent 
variable. Since our research question is aimed at identifying conditions under which CPDR 
announcements may be related to higher positive abnormal returns, we construct regression 
models with independent variables associated with our hypotheses to see which, if any, moderate 
the relationship between CPDR announcements and positive abnormal stock returns.  
Independent variables. For Hypothesis 2, we included a dummy variable third-party 
donations that took a value of 1 if the donation announcement explicitly referred to the inclusion 
of employee-, customer- and/or business partner donations in the total reported donation amount 
(1 = YES, 0 = NO). For Hypothesis 3, we created a dummy variable in-kind included to capture 
whether donations were explicitly reported to include in-kind giving (1 = YES, 0 = NO). The 
dummy variable local presence (Hypothesis 4) captures whether donating companies 
emphasized their local presence in the disaster-stricken region in their donation announcement (1 
= local presence mentioned, 0 = no mention of local presence). Lastly, the dummy variable long 
term (Hypothesis 4) reflects CPDR announcements that described donations as pertaining to long 
term reconstruction efforts, such as the building of schools or hospitals (1 = YES, 0 = NO).  
Control variables. The first control variable, donation value, is the log-transformed US 
dollar value of company donations. We introduce this as a control to allow for the possibility that 
the size of the donation may affect investors’ perception of the strategic nature of the donation 
either positively (higher investment levels relative to competitors) or negatively (an exorbitant 
expenditure that outweighs the potential gains). Second, we controlled for confounding events. 
According to McWilliams and Siegel (1997), it is essential to isolate the effect of a given event   17 
from the effects of other events. Since, however, confounding events may be positive (new 
product announcements, contract awards or acquisition activity) or negative (labor unrest, 
lawsuit or restructuring) we do not make assumptions prima facie with respect to patterns in the 
confounding events (Meznar et al., 1998). That is, they could be entirely random “noise” in the 
data and thus have no systematic effect on the outcome. Therefore we do not exclude these firms 
but rather introduce a control dummy for firms that experienced confounding events on day 0 
and 1 (the day of the donation announcement and the day after). We found 24 companies with 
contaminating events, listed in Table 1 together with the events identified.  
TABLE 1 here 
 
We also controlled for reaction time, since the timing of the donations can have two 
potential effects. A short reaction time could be rewarded by shareholders as a result of the 
novelty and first mover advantages associated with early donations, with later donations seen as 
mimetic. On the other hand, investors may associate later announcements with a higher 
likelihood of strategic giving, since management will have had more time to consider possible 
synergies between the donation and business strategy, while early donations could be seen as 
“knee jerk” reactions that hold little potential for contributing value to the firm itself. The 
reaction time variable is a dummy taking the value of 0 for donations made between August 29 
and September 4, 2005, and a value of 1 for announcements made from September 5 onwards.  
Lastly, we controlled for firms in the oil industry (oil). Media reports at the time of 
Hurricane Katrina focused much attention on the impact of the Hurricane on oil production in the 
Gulf of Mexico. Hurricane Katrina shut down most offshore platforms and onshore wells in the 
region, which accounts for over a quarter of US oil production, and idled 10 percent of the   18 
country's refining industry. In less than a week, gas prices jumped by as much as 60 cents per 
gallon.
3 In addition, a report from the Federal Trade Commission found that 15 unidentified oil 
companies (seven refiners, two wholesalers and six retailers) had higher-than-average gasoline 
prices in the first week of September, and that these higher prices were not substantially 
attributable either to higher costs or to national or international market trends. Although federal 
investigators reported that they could find no evidence that oil companies manipulated prices or 
colluded to take advantage of the situation to increase profits, these abnormally high prices are 
likely responsible for the positive impact on the share price.
4 Therefore, while we expect our 
hypotheses to hold equally for oil companies, we include a dummy variable for oil companies to 
account for this initial abnormal return. 
 
The final regression model looks as follows: 
ARit, t = [0] = α0 + β1 OIL + β 2 CF + β 3 AM + β 4 RT + β 5 IK + β 6 TP+ β 7 LT+ β 8 LP+ ε 
    
where ARit, t = [0] is the abnormal return for firm i over the event window (t = 0), OIL is the 
dummy for the seven companies in the oil industry, CF is the dummy for the 24 firms with 
confounding events on days 0 and 1, AM is the log-transformed dollar value of reported 
donations, RT is the reaction time dummy, IK reflects the inclusion of in-kind goods in the 
donation, TP the inclusion of third party donations in the total reported donation, LT is the 
dummy for donations including commitments to long-term reconstruction efforts, and LP 
                                                 
3 New York Times, Katrina’s Shock to the System, September 4, 2005 
4 Edward Epstein, No collusion or price gouging Chronicle Washington Bureau, May 2006   19 
indicates whether the company referred to its local presence in the disaster-stricken region. We 
report descriptive statistics and correlations in Table 2. 
 
TABLE 2 here 
 
RESULTS 
The abnormal average return associated with a CPDR announcement in the wake of 
Hurricane Katrina for all 108 firms is shown in Table 3. The table shows the average return on 
each day from the pre-announcement period through the post-announcement period (day -10 
through day +10). We add the cumulated (average) abnormal return (CAR) to check whether 
some delayed effect exists that would justify considering a longer event window. Additionally, 
we show the results of the binomial Z-test for each day. The binomial Z-test examines whether 
on any given day the number of firms with negative abnormal returns is significantly different 
from the number of firms with positive abnormal returns. In the presence of systematic abnormal 
returns, the number of firms should differ significantly, generating a significant Z-statistic.  
 
TABLE 3 here 
 
Table 3 clearly shows that there is no overall positive or negative pattern in abnormal 
stock returns on day 0 across the sample of firms as a whole, nor is there a cumulative effect 
evident anywhere in the pre- or post-announcement period. The results show that, overall, 
investors neither rewarded nor punished firms across the board that donated in response to the 
Katrina disaster (Hypothesis 1). Table 1 does show a significant negative effect on day 1 (the day   20 
following each announcement), but as we discuss below, this appears entirely attributable to 
outlier effects of oil industry firms in the sample, all of which exhibited strong positive ARs on 
day 1.  
Table 4 shows the results for the dependent variable, AR on day 0, regressed upon our 
independent variables and controls (Model 1). The model shows that when controlling for oil 
industry membership, the presence of confounding events, donation value and reaction time, two 
of the four independent variables return significant coefficients. The coefficient for the inclusion 
of in-kind goods in the donation is significant (p = 0.068) but negative (-0.166). We 
hypothesized that in-kind donations would be viewed as strategic by investors by virtue of being 
linked to market development and/or an opportunity to dispose of excess inventory, and thus be 
positively interpreted. The negative coefficient associated with in-kind donations therefore runs 
counter to Hypothesis 2.  
 
TABLE 4 here 
 
The coefficient for “long term donations” is positive (0.180) and significant (p = 0.047), 
providing support for our hypothesis that CPDR announcements describing contributions to 
long-term reconstruction efforts would be interpreted as strategic by investors (Hypothesis 4). 
The coefficients for inclusion of third-party donations (Hypothesis 3) and references to the 
donating company’s local presence in the disaster region (Hypothesis 5) were both positive 
(0.088 and 0.112, respectively) but statistically insignificant (p = 0.336 and p = 0.210, 
respectively). In addition, the control variables generate a number of insights. The donation value 
variable shows that larger donation amounts were interpreted negatively by investors. Also, oil   21 
industry membership was associated with strong positive abnormal returns (β = 0.531, p = 
0.000), as suggested by the evidence in the media on gas and oil price rises discussed above. 
Reaction time was not associated with positive or negative returns (β = 0.094, p = 0.294), and the 
presence of confounding events was not linked to any systematic pattern in stock returns (β = -
0.134, p = 0.175) in accordance with the arguments of Meznar et al. (1998).  
For comparison, we add a second model (Model 2) using abnormal returns on day 1 as 
the dependent variable. Model 2 helps us to verify our efficient market assumption, which is tied 
to our selection of a single-day event window. Table 4 shows that the day 0 regression (Model 1) 
is significant at p = 0.000 (F-statistic 5.576) with an adjusted R
2 value of 0.270, while the day 1 
regression (Model 2) is only significant at p = 0.051 (F-statistic 2.034) with an adjusted R
2 value 
of just 0.077. The results of Model 2 provide strong evidence that the variables in Model 1 are 
not coincidental and that their effects were immediately processed in stock prices, supporting the 
efficient market hypothesis and our choice to opt for a one-day event window. 
 
DISCUSSION 
Drawing on the literature on strategic philanthropy, we present a case for positive stock 
market reactions to social behaviors like donations to disaster relief. We contend that such 
donations can be seen as concrete contributions to reconstituting the competitive environment 
through contributing to rebuilding infrastructure, re-developing paralyzed markets, or ensuring 
that employees are secure, as well as a more general investment in reputation, trust and 
legitimacy among a broad range of stakeholders. Based on these arguments we hypothesize an 
overall positive stock market response to corporate philanthropic donations following 
catastrophic events like Hurricane Katrina. Additionally, we explore a number of donation-  22 
specific factors which we expect will be especially perceived as “strategic”, and thus will be 
related to even higher positive abnormal returns.   
Our overarching hypothesis, namely that donation announcements would be associated 
with positive abnormal stock returns, was firmly rejected in our analysis. In other words, despite 
the arguments suggesting that stock markets might value social behavior in general, the evidence 
did not support this contention, as our data show no systematic reaction across the 108 firms in 
the sample as a whole. While this result does not support our hypothesized positive relationship, 
it also does not indicate a negative relationship. In other words, investors do not generally punish 
companies for engaging in CPDR, which suggests that investors afford companies managers 
some level of discretion in this particular case. Our analysis does, however, lend some support to 
the notion that investors’ perception of the value of philanthropic donations to disaster relief is to 
some extent conditional upon characteristics of the donation. This conclusion is in line with Luo 
and Bhattacharya’s (2006) argument that there is “no simple, unconditional relationship between 
CSR and market value”.  
Our results suggest that donating to long-term reconstruction efforts as opposed to 
immediate disaster relief is interpreted positively by investors. Our explanation is that investors 
expect such donations to contribute positively to a firm’s profitability by enhancing its reputation 
and brand awareness in the community and as a way to maintain or establish market presence. 
Surprisingly, in-kind giving, the other significant predictor in the model, was negative in our 
analysis. One possible explanation is that investors interpreted in-kind giving as an element of 
immediate disaster relief, as opposed to a longer-term perspective on developing or consolidating 
market position, brand awareness and reputation. An alternate explanation is that investors 
associated in-kind giving with efforts to “ingratiate” the firm among the impacted community   23 
(Godfrey, 2004). In this case, the donating firm gains no “moral capital” because although the 
cause (CPDR) is considered positive, the firm’s intentions are not perceived as genuine.   
Our other two predictors, the inclusion of third party donations and local presence, were 
positive but insignificant in our model. Although our results contribute to our understanding of 
the conditions under which donations may be positively or negatively interpreted by investors, 
together the four predictors we tested do not paint a clear picture from the strategic philanthropy 
perspective. Additional work may be required to establish more clearly what investors consider 
strategic, since it has been argued that investors are not necessarily rational or utility-
maximizing. For instance, it has been proposed that investors may demand social behavior from 
firms even though evidence of economic gain is absent (Mackey, Mackey and Barney, 2007). 
Qualitative work on investor perceptions and the tools they use for market analysis, as well as 
quantitative, transaction-level investigations of stock movements by different types of investors 
may help to shed light on this in the future.   
While we did not hypothesize a donation value effect, the negative coefficient associated 
with the donation value variable in our model implies that there are limits to how generous 
investors are willing to let managers be. To interpret the donation value results we must discuss 
the relationship between the log-transformed donation value variable included in the regression, 
and the underlying variable expressed in (US) dollar terms. Transformation is required to 
establish a normal distribution and a linear relationship with the dependent variable. 
“Untransforming” the donation variable back to dollar terms de facto changes the linear 
relationship established in the regression model into a curvilinear relationship. In our model, the 
average of the log-transformed donation value is 14.59 (equal to roughly $2.1 million), with a 
standard deviation of 1.08. One standard deviation below the mean and one standard deviation   24 
above the mean translate into donation values of $700,000 and $6.5 million, respectively. The 
model therefore suggests that the negative effect of a $2.1 million donation relative to a 
$700,000 donation is identical to the negative effect of a $6.5 million donation relative to a $2.1 
million donation. In other words, the marginal negative effect on stock prices per dollar donated 
declines as donation values rise.    
The managerial implications of these results are profound. First, the room for 
“discretionary” giving (Carroll, 1999) is limited. Earlier research has noted that companies tend 
not to reveal information on the amount and recipients of philanthropy to stockholders, and 
attribute this reluctance to concern about how investors will react (Bartkus et al., 2002). The fact 
that donations do not automatically lead to positive stock market reactions should caution 
managers compelled by humanitarian motives to avoid “knee-jerk” reactions that might translate 
into relatively high donation amounts and/or donations that do not appear genuine. However, the 
alternate argument is equally true: there appears to be little risk inherent to engaging in CPDR in 
terms of stock price. The negative interpretation is that managers driven by such motives should 
avoid communicating “non-strategic” donations to the stock market altogether, which then raises 
fundamental concerns about exactly how we as a society value social investments by firms. The 
positive interpretation is that companies can themselves benefit by taking the time to consider 
their disaster response options carefully. After all, there is no penalty for “late” donations. 
Our study has a number of limitations that provide additional direction for future 
research. It remains unclear, for example, how long the effect of CPDR on market value lasts. 
The longitudinal dimension of our study is limited to the ten-day post announcement period. 
Within this ten-day period, we observe that the post announcement period shows no cumulative 
effects, implying that ten days after announcing, stock prices remain essentially at the level of   25 
day 0. Further research, using different methodologies, is required to explore the longer-term 
effects of CPDR on stock prices and the potential long-run benefits to companies more generally. 
Second, we recognize that our results on CPDR and market value may not be fully generalizable 
to other forms of philanthropy. If the positive impact of philanthropy on market value depends at 
least in part on the supply of, and demand for, philanthropy (Mackey et al., 2007), the scale of 
media attention for disasters like Hurricane Katrina and the outpouring of support by a wide 
range of actors suggest that “demand” for donating to Katrina was high, and thus Katrina can be 
seen as a “safe issue” for companies to donate to (Godfrey, 2004). It remains unclear whether 
other, less universal charitable causes can be analyzed across similar dimensions as those 
explored here, and if they would reveal similar patterns of stock price reactions. That is, other 
causes may not have the same universal appeal to the underlying ethical values of a wide range 
of people. Third, future research may investigate the link between CPDR and corporate strategy. 
While we shed light on the role of donation characteristics in market value, it remains to be seen 
how firm characteristics may moderate this relationship (Luo and Bhattacharya, 2006).  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
This paper explores the financial consequences for firms, in terms of market value, of 
engaging in corporate philanthropic disaster response (CPDR). In adopting this line of inquiry, 
the study was motivated in part by Margolis and Walsh’s (2003: 272) argument that “the market 
will ultimately sort out whether [philanthropy] is the best use of a firm’s resources”. Our study 
suggests that investors do pay attention to the question of whether philanthropy, in this case 
CPDR, can be considered strategic. The results show that investors’ interpretation of donations 
to Hurricane Katrina by US firms depended on whether the donation was aimed at long-term   26 
reconstruction and/or included in-kind donations. Although we did not investigate the value of 
the donation, we found this to be negatively related to abnormal stock returns.  
Our study contributes to the literature in three ways. First, we explore a previously 
unstudied form of corporate social behavior, namely CPDR in the case of Hurricane Katrina, and 
link this to established literature on strategic philanthropy. Second, we contribute to the literature 
on the relationship between corporate social behavior and firm financial performance by 
establishing a relationship between CPDR and stock returns. Third, we show that event study 
methodology can be a relevant approach for analyzing the relationship between social behavior 
and market value in the case of specific, readily identifiable social behaviors like CPDR. Our 
results suggest that markets do process this information, and they do so immediately, as the 
efficient markets hypothesis would suggest. 
Considerable media attention has been paid to companies’ disaster response efforts 
subsequent to recent disasters like the Tsunami and Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. If attention for 
corporate involvement in disaster relief and reconstruction efforts is growing, such behavior may 
be increasingly institutionalized over time. That is, past behavior may lead us to expect similar 
behavior in the future. If firms have a role to play in alleviating social ills (Margolis and Walsh, 
2003), then it is important to know how society values that role. Our conclusion is that in 
general, the value investors attach to such behavior is more limited than much of the recent 
literature on strategic philanthropy would suggest. While on the one hand our results provide 
evidence that investors do interpret donation announcements, the mixed results presented here 
may indicate that they do not always interpret them rationally. The efficient market hypothesis 
assumes that investors act as rational utility maximizers; future research may be aimed at the 
cognition of investors and how donations are in fact perceived. Additionally, the efficient market   27 
hypothesis assumes that engaging in strategic philanthropy would have only a “one-off” effect. 
As CPDR becomes institutionalized, the efficient market hypothesis suggests repeat donations by 
a single firm in the face of new disasters would not be perceived as “news” by investors. Future 
research may explore whether investors interpret subsequent or follow-up donations to a given 
disaster differently than initial donations. 
However, even if the “one-off effect” has already been fully absorbed by the market, 
CPDR may lead to the additional benefits supposed by the strategic philanthropy literature, 
namely reputation gains, legitimacy and trust. These benefits are likely to accumulate through 
time, adding to firms’ competitive edge and thus allowing them to outperform their competitors 
(or at least competitors with weaker reputations and less success with strategic philanthropy). 
Hence it may be difficult to isolate the longer-term effects of CPDR, or any other example of 
strategic philanthropy, from the fluctuations in reputation and competitive position over time. 
Future research may be aimed at disentangling the longer-term performance implications of 
individual acts of strategic philanthropy like CPDR, for instance by distinguishing between the 
long-term gains of short-term disaster relief versus longer-term reconstruction efforts. 
We explore stock market reactions to corporate disaster response as a facet of the debate 
on the performance consequences of firm social behavior, specifically of financial and in-kind 
support for social causes (Peloza, 2006). Although we find that CPDR in its most basic form is 
related to positive abnormal stock returns, we also observe factors that moderate that 
relationship, some positively and some negatively. The key conclusion for managers is that they 
must consider carefully their added value for disaster relief and reconstruction and be strategic in 
their donations, since “knee-jerk” responses may be punished by investors and ultimately may 
also have less value for disaster victims than well-considered, business-relevant responses.   28 
We also generate additional insights as to the relevance of event study methodology for 
measuring the effects of companies’ social behaviors. One of the problems with using event 
study methodology to measure reactions to non-financial behavior is the difficulty in isolating a 
narrowly defined event window, since event studies hinge on the assumption that markets will 
react quickly to information (McWilliams and Siegel, 1997), and that this reaction can be 
isolated from all the other forces that drive stock price fluctuations. We show here that in cases 
where the event linked to social behavior – at the corporate level – can be clearly defined (a 
donation announcement) and associated with a specific date (the date of the press release), event 
study methodology generates results that can be interpreted in the context of the CSR-
performance debate.     29 
APPENDIX  
Companies in the sample 
Company  Press Release Date 
ACCENTURE  August 29, 2005 
LOWE'S COMPANIES  August 29, 2005 
COCA COLA  August 30, 2005 
CHEVRON  August 30, 2005 
ALTRIA GROUP INCO.  August 30, 2005 
CVS  August 30, 2005 
HESS  August 30, 2005 
AMR (AMERICAN AIRLINES)  August 31, 2005 
CISCO SYSTEMS  August 31, 2005 
ELI LILLY  August 31, 2005 
CITIGROUP  August 31, 2005 
BEST BUY  August 31, 2005 
PFIZER  August 31, 2005 
DOW CHEMICALS  August 31, 2005 
BRISTOL MYERS SQUIBB  August 31, 2005 
WALT DISNEY  August 31, 2005 
HOME DEPOT  August 31, 2005 
ELECTRONIC DATA SYSTEMS  August 31, 2005 
NORTHROP GRUMMAN  August 31, 2005 
JOHNSON CONTROLS  August 31, 2005 
VIACOM 'A'  August 31, 2005 
RITE AID  August 31, 2005 
FANNIE MAE  August 31, 2005 
QWEST COMMS.INTL.  August 31, 2005 
DUKE ENERGY  August 31, 2005 
KROGER  August 31, 2005 
WASHINGTON MUTUAL  August 31, 2005 
VERIZON COMMS.  September 1, 2005 
FREDDIE MAC  September 1, 2005 
COMCAST 'A'  September 1, 2005 
BOEING  September 1, 2005 
GENERAL MOTORS  September 1, 2005 
CONOCOPHILLIPS  September 1, 2005 
ALLSTATE  September 1, 2005 
INTERNATIONAL BUS.MACH.  September 1, 2005   30 
Company  Press Release Date 
WALGREEN  September 1, 2005 
TYCO INTL.  September 1, 2005 
HCA  September 1, 2005 
UNITED PARCEL SER.  September 1, 2005 
WELLS FARGO & CO  September 1, 2005 
AMERICAN EXPRESS  September 1, 2005 
MARATHON OIL  September 1, 2005 
INTEL  September 1, 2005 
BANK OF AMERICA  September 1, 2005 
TYSON FOODS 'A'  September 1, 2005 
WYETH  September 1, 2005 
AT&T  September 1, 2005 
VALERO ENERGY  September 1, 2005 
HUMANA  September 1, 2005 
SUNOCO  September 1, 2005 
SUPERVALU  September 1, 2005 
WEYERHAEUSER  September 1, 2005 
KIMBERLY-CLARK  September 1, 2005 
HONEYWELL INTL.  September 1, 2005 
EDISON INTL.  September 1, 2005 
US BANCORP  September 1, 2005 
AETNA  September 2, 2005 
GOODYEAR TIRE & RUB.  September 2, 2005 
PROCTER & GAMBLE  September 2, 2005 
EXXON MOBIL  September 2, 2005 
JOHNSON & JOHNSON  September 2, 2005 
MCDONALDS  September 2, 2005 
NEWS CORP.'A'  September 2, 2005 
XEROX  September 2, 2005 
ANHEUSER-BUSCH COS.  September 2, 2005 
LOCKHEED MARTIN  September 2, 2005 
DEERE  September 2, 2005 
CIGNA  September 2, 2005 
MORGAN STANLEY  September 2, 2005 
ALCOA  September 2, 2005 
EASTMAN KODAK  September 2, 2005 
CENDANT  September 2, 2005   31 
Company  Press Release Date 
MCKESSON  September 2, 2005 
AMER.ELEC.PWR.  September 2, 2005 
SEARS HOLDINGS  September 3, 2005 
DU PONT E I DE NEMOURS  September 5, 2005 
TARGET  September 6, 2005 
MOTOROLA  September 6, 2005 
FEDERATED DEPT.STRS.  September 6, 2005 
UNITED TECHNOLOGIES  September 6, 2005 
SAFEWAY  September 6, 2005 
CHUBB  September 6, 2005 
ABBOTT LABS.  September 7, 2005 
FORD MOTOR  September 7, 2005 
WELLPOINT  September 7, 2005 
GAP  September 7, 2005 
FEDEX  September 7, 2005 
PRUDENTIAL FINL.  September 8, 2005 
METLIFE  September 8, 2005 
MICROSOFT  September 9, 2005 
GEORGIA PACIFIC (DELIST.23/12/05)  September 9, 2005 
COUNTRYWIDE FINL.  September 9, 2005 
CARDINAL HEALTH  September 12, 2005 
AMERISOURCEBERGEN  September 13, 2005 
MERCK & CO.  September 13, 2005 
BELLSOUTH  September 13, 2005 
NATIONWIDE FINL.SVS.  September 13, 2005 
STAPLES  September 13, 2005 
SPRINT NEXTEL  September 14, 2005 
UNION PACIFIC  September 14, 2005 
OFFICE DEPOT  September 16, 2005 
CATERPILLAR  September 27, 2005 
WAL MART STORES  September 29, 2005 
HEWLETT-PACKARD  October 10, 2005 
TENET HLTHCR.  November 23, 2005   32 
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TABLE 3 
Hurricane Katrina Donation Announcement and Abnormal Return
a, b 
 day  AR   t-value    AR C   Proportion positive 
-10  0,0016  1,0025    0,0016  48%  
-9  0,0002  0,1175    0,0018  52%  
-8  -0,0003  -0,1862    0,0015  47%  
-7  -0,0011  -0,6646    0,0004  46%  
-6  0,0006  0,3473    0,0010  48%  
-5  -0,0023  -1,4548    -0,0013  34% *** 
-4  0,0006  0,3999    -0,0007  47%  
-3  -0,0016  -0,9895    -0,0023  47%  
-2  -0,0007  -0,4415    -0,0030  43%  
-1  -0,0003  -0,1572    -0,0033  44%  
0  0,0008  0,4938    -0,0025  50%  
1  -0,0041  -2,5372 **  -0,0065  46%  
2  0,0001  0,0855    -0,0064  55%  
3  -0,0008  -0,5082    -0,0072  45%  
4  0,0013  0,8162    -0,0059  49%  
5  0,0005  0,3065    -0,0054  54%  
6  -0,0018  -1,1187    -0,0072  40% ** 
7  0,0013  0,8155    -0,0059  54%  
8  -0,0030  -1,8571 *  -0,0089  44%  
9  -0,0002  -0,1354    -0,0091  47%  
10  -0,0023  -1,4310    -0,0114  44%  
a N = 108 
bBrown & Warner T-statistics in parentheses 
** is p< 0.05 
* is p< 0.10    39 
TABLE 4 
Regression of abnormal returns on strategic donation characteristics
a, b 
  Model 1: day 0                Model 2: day 1 
Variables  B   t-statistic  B   t-statistic 
Constant    **  2.378     0.409 
Confounding events  -0.134   -1.366  -0.190 *  -1.723 
Oil industry dummy  0.531 ***  5.359  -0.239 **  -2.148 
Donation value
b  -0.220 **  -2.384  -0.062    -0.599 
Reaction time  0.094   1.055  0.016    0.156 
Including in-kind  -0.166 *  -1.876  0.077    0.772 
Long term  0.180 **  2.011  0.030    0.300 
Including third party donations  0.088   0.967  0.014    0.138 
Mention of local presence  0.112   1.262  0.044    0.445 
           
F-statistic  5.576 ***    2.034 *   
R
2 (adj.)  0.270     0.077    
acoefficients are standardized for ease of interpretation 
blog transformed 
*** is p<0.01 
** is p<0.05 
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